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Abstract
This paper aims at proving that social interactions can easily be ra-
tionalized by individual preferences as dened in standard microeconomic
theory. For that purpose, we show individual choice rationality to be log-
ically equivalent to social consistency, when individual rationality means
that individual preferences are completely ordered and social consistency
that there is a one-to-one mapping between a given family of social com-
munities and the existence of a particular (unique, reexive and symmet-
ric) interaction relation between individuals. Moreover, continuity and
monotonicity of individual preferences are shown to t the modeling of
group loyalty when group loyalty is dened as the ability to freely accept
a personal loss for the global gain of a particular population.
Cet article vise à montrer que les interactions sociales peuvent être
déduites des relations individuelles de préférence (et vice versa). Nous
montrons ainsi que le postulat de rationalité individuelle est logiquement
équivalent à celui de cohérence sociale dès lors que le postulat de rational-
ité individuelle signie que les préférences des agents sont des préordres
complets et celui de cohérence sociale, quil existe une bijection entre
chaque système de coalitions et la relation dinteraction (unique, réexive
et symétrique) qui le soutend. De plus, on montre que la continuité et
la monotonie des préférences individuelles permettent de modéliser la no-
tion de loyauté communautaire dès lors que la loyauté communautaire est
dénie en tant que la capacité des agents à accepter une perte personnelle
dutilité au prot dun gain collectif pour une coalition particulière.
JEL Classication : A13-D71-J15
Keywords : Preferences, social interaction, communities, group loyalty
1 Introduction
1.1. Social Interaction within Economic Theory. Standard economic
theory is generally considered unable to incorporate social phenomena because
I thank Friedrich Schneider, Tzachi Gilboa and Jacques-François Thisse for helpful com-
ments and suggestions. For correspondence : Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris 2, 92 rue
dAssas, 75006, Paris, France, e-mail address : billot@u-paris2.fr
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it rests on the methodological assumption of individualism. Hence, to build on
maximizing behavior, most economic models require that individuals utility
must depend on a quite limited set of arguments: while workers are supposed
to be concerned with wages, relationships with colleagues or supervisors are
assumed to be indi¤erent; while consumers are supposed to be concerned with
prices, neighborsconsumptions are assumed to be irrelevant; while voters are
supposed to be concerned with candidates, friendspolitical preferences are as-
sumed to be without inuence. In other words, people are supposed to choose
jobs, goods or representatives independently of their social environment. Con-
formism or mimetism, fashion or tradition are then hardly seen as economic
phenomena. As noticed by Postlewaite (1998): At the same time that single-
minded materialistic focus has made economics successful as a discipline, it has
led to a belief that economics methodology is inadequate to understand impor-
tant aspects of human behavior, particularly in settings in which individuals
are concerned about the opinion of others. Even though most economists are
sympathetic to the idea that social relations are important, they are generally
reluctant to explicitly incorporate them within economic theory. Two reasons
could explain this reluctance: rst, increasing the number of variables which
a¤ect individualsutility necessarily decreases the predictive power of the mod-
els, especially if coordination problems arise; second, when interactions produce
externalities which can be directly captured within groups (or social networks),
interactions can be considered negligible (see Becker, 1971).
1.2. An Emerging Theory of Social Interaction. In the last decade,
several authors have nevertheless proposed new themes and new analyses which
try to explicitly link sociological considerations and economic ones: for instance,
Akerlof (1997) with the concept of social distance, Becker (1991) with that of
social inuence, Benabou (1996) for the notion of community structure, Man-
ski (1993) for the so-called reection problem... and so forth. Empirical re-
searchers have also investigated the importance of peer e¤ects and neighborhood
e¤ects in crime (Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996), unemployment (Topa, 2001)
or group loyalty (Luttmer, 2001). The key point of all these contributions, say
the emerging theory of social interaction (Akerlof 1997, p. 1005), is the fact
that individuals are assumed to be deeply inuenced in choices and economic
behaviors by the social environment, that is they are no longer considered as
Robinsons but rather as the members of particular groups, class, city... However,
the link between individuals and social groups is typically symmetric: individu-
alschoices are determined by the social environment as well as the environment
is determined by individualschoices (see e.g. Stau¤er and Sahini, 2006). While
basic economic theory is just concerned with individual preferences and their
consequences on choices, the economic theory of social interaction is also con-
cerned with identities and the way these identities inuence choices (see Kasher
and Rubinstein, 1997; Samet and Schmeidler, 2002): while the former theory
only wonders what do individuals prefer?, the latter also asks who are they?,
this last question meaning rst with whom do they interact? and second how
does social interaction inuence their choices?.
Methodologically, the great majority of the theoretical papers in this new
eld have chosen to use a common modeling framework stemmed from the analy-
sis of interacting particle systems in physics: they assumed that any individuals
optimal choice varies positively with the average choice of his group. However,
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several recent contributions (see e.g. Morris, 1997; 2000) try to emphasize so-
cial interactions outside of this current methodology in using another formal
analogy: the one existing between populations - or communities - within a social
structure and events - or beliefs - within an information structure. Actually, we
can observe rst that a social group is a subset of individuals linked by a social
relation while an event is a subset of possible worlds linked by an accessibility
relation (Kripke, 1963; Aumann, 1976; Billot and Walliser, 1999). Second, we
can also observe that beliefs and communities are conceptually twins since they
are both based on elements - worlds on one side, individuals on the other - which
are su¢ ciently joined by a relation - of accessibility on one side, of interaction on
the other - to be nally isolatedfrom the others elements. Then, the basic intu-
ition of this paper is the following: while Kripke (1963) describes these isolated
elements as indistinguishablewhen dened as abstract worlds, we describe the
individuals as interdependentwhen preferences are mutually sensitive. This
way, we suggest that social interactions between individuals are depending on
their preferences as well as the individual preferences are depending on the so-
cial interactions. In other words, individual preferences and social interactions
are two possible representations of the same evidence. In order to prove it, we
establish that the standard assumption in microeconomics of complete ordered
individual preferences is logically equivalent to the consistency of the social sys-
tem, that is the existence of a unique reexive and symmetric binary relation
between individuals which perfectly describes all the social interactions.
1.3. Community and Loyalty. In this paper, we use three main tools:
interaction, interdependence and group loyalty. The two rsts are not original.
They already exist in the literature (Akerlof, 1997) and the third one is used as
an illustration of the intrinsic relevance of microeconomics to model some social
evidences.
 An interaction is a social situation where two individuals are su¢ ciently
connected to consider themselves as social neighbors and we dene a social com-
munity as a subset of individuals whose social neighborhood is fully included
in the same particular population. When assuming the social inuence to be
encapsulated within social neighbors, a social community is therefore an exclu-
sive concept in the sense where it forbids to be inuenced by anyone belonging
to another population (Lickel et al., 2006). In fact, belonging to what we call a
native population- to be gay or hispanic, protestant or catholic - is just a given
individual data which does not necessarily imply to belong to the associated so-
cial community.1 Belonging to a social community is much more demanding
than belonging to a particular population: it requires to never signicantly in-
teract with people of other native populations. An individual may be French and
catholic and may have jewish friends, work with muslim people and be married
with an Italian woman, i.e. may deeply interact outside his native population.
Then, because of his various social interactions, he may be sensitive to various
populations lot, jewish, muslim, European... In this case, it is reasonable to
consider that he does not belong to the French catholic community even if he
belongs to the French catholic native population. On contrary, a Chinese immi-
grant who only interacts within his native population (because, for instance, of
1We use the term nativeas a synonymous for exogeneous. A native population gathers
people who have not previously decided to be gathered but whose idiosyncratic identity,
according to a particular criterion, is very similar.
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the language), does not regularly see and meet individuals outside the Chinese
population and then he is a natural candidate to be a member of the Chinese
community.
 Interdependence is used to describe an individual preference focused on
a particular population in such a way that this individual feels himself only
concerned with what economically happens to this particular population. We
then dene an economic community as a subset of interdependent individuals,
that is a community of economic interests. A Chinese immigrant whose pref-
erences translate that he only cares about the Chinese population issues (and
then neglects the other populationsinterest) obviously belongs to the Chinese
economic community. On the contrary, even if he belongs to the French catholic
population, an individual may neglect the very interests of this population and
may be particularly sensitive to what happens to the jewish or muslim popu-
lations; this way, it is reasonable to consider that he has no real true common
interest with French catholics and consequently that he does not belong to the
economic community they form.
A priori, the two kinds of communities are conceptually independent since
they do not involve the same kind of relationships. Nevertheless, our purpose
is precisely to show that this conceptual independence is no longer valid when
individual preferences are constrained to satisfy standard properties. More pre-
cisely, when individuals are assumed to be rational in the standard sense, that
is when their preferences are completely ordered as in an Arrow-Debreu frame-
work, we prove that the economic communities form a social consistent system.
This result also proves that the language of preferences can be used to describe
some social basic evidences. In order to illustrate this last thesis, we later show
how to translate the concept of group loyalty as dened by Luttmer (2001) in
terms of preferences properties, that is continuity and monotonicity.
1.4. The Results. The organization of the paper is the following: in Section
2, the formal analogy between information structure and social structure is used
to dene social communities in terms of neighborhoods based on interactions
between individuals, that is a reexive and symmetric binary relation. Then,
we prove (Theorem 1) that a social system, i.e. the set of all social communities
within a great set of individuals called society, is consistent w.r.t the individual
interactions if and only if (i) the society is a social community itself and (ii) the
social system is monotone. In Section 3, while dening an economic community
as a subset of individuals who are interdependent in terms of preferences (over
alternatives), we prove (Theorem 2) that an economic system, i.e. the set of
all economic communities, is consistent w.r.t the individual interactions if and
only if individual preferences are completely ordered. This way, we show the
conditions under which social interactions can be rationalized by individual
preferences. In Section 4, we introduce the notion of social loyalty and prove (i)
(Theorem 3) that any neighborhood is made of loyal individuals if preferences
are continuous and monotone and (ii) (Theorem 4) that any social community
is made of loyal individuals if preferences are continuous and monotone and if
individuals are empathic.
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2 Interactions and Social Communities
Consider a xed nite set S of n individuals. Call society the set S and popu-
lation any nonempty element of 2S . Take as a simple representation of social
interaction a binary relation between individuals denoted N : write j 2 N (i)
if individual j socially interacts with (i.e. is a social neighbor of) individual
i. This way, the subset N (i) denes the (social) neighborhood of i. We assume
that the interaction N is (1) reexive: 8 i 2 S, i 2 N (i) and (2) symmetric:
8i; j 2 S, i 2 N (j)) j 2 N (i).
One natural way to interpret the social relation N is to consider that two
individuals i and j are said to be neighbors if the intensity of their relationship
is signicant: for instance if they spend together a signicative part of their
time (greater than a given amount under which they consider that there is
no genuine relation) but also if they share a signicative number of cultural
values meaning that they both belong to the same circumscribed population of
individuals within S even if they seldom meet. The rst kind of interaction is
rather spatial while the second is rather cultural but in both cases, the concept
of interaction translates a certain sort of proximity. Then, what we called
interaction throughout these pages is conceptually and even formally more
general than Akerlofs since not necessarily related to a distance (even social).
Actually, this denition leads us to distinguish people who meet at random in
the bus or in the street for a short while (who then do not really interact) from
people who are truly in interaction such like those who work in the same o¢ ce,
those who share regular cultural activities and so forth...
We simply propose to dene a social community (based on a native popula-
tion A) as the larger 1-cohesive2 nonempty subset of A.
Formally, we denote by soc (A) the social community based on native popu-
lation A:
soc (A) = fi 2 S : N (i)  Ag . (1)
Indeed, each social community soc (A) forms a more cohesive population than
its complement in S. A social community is then a population of individuals
locally closed by the social interaction. Each social community is a population
of S but each population S does not necessarily form a social community.
Empirically, except the set of all human beings, there is nowadays very few
native populationswhich can be said 1-cohesive (except maybe some fully iso-
lated social organizations such like primitive tribes who do not even know that
they are not alone on Earth ...); generally, in each potential native population,
there exist individuals who socially interact with outsidepeople, that is indi-
viduals who then do not belong to the community associated with their native
population. In our words, this means that communities are w.l.o.g. smaller than
2According to Ellison (1993) and Morris (2000), a population A of individuals is said to be
p-cohesive if every member i 2 A is such that there exists at least a proportion p of his social
neighbors who belong to A. Hence, a population A is 1-cohesive whenever the subset of all
individuals i 2 S such that N (i)  A is equal to A. However, for every nonempty population
A  S, it is possible (at least for a modeler) to point out individuals i 2 S such that N (i)  A
and to isolate them from individuals j 2 S for which there exist individuals k =2 A such that
k 2 N (j). Note that no one can be sure that the latter individuals are su¢ ciently cohesive
to form a true community (since p 2 [0; 1]) while the former ones can always revendicate a
strong specic link (p = 1).
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populations since more demanding (exclusive) in terms of social interactions.3
This criterion - allowing to distinguish a native population from its community -
is not purely formal. In most big western cities, Paris, London or New York
City..., one can easily observe the di¤erent local communities (jewish, Chinese,
Irish, gay...) living in some specic areas (Le Maraisfor Parisian gays or East
Londonfor Indian people) where the density of the corresponding native popu-
lations is so high that the possibility to socially interact with someone belonging
to another population is low. Nevertheless, in the same time, one can nd gays
in each Parisian borough even far from Le Marais as well as Indian people in the
West London, which illustrates the empirical di¤erence between a population
and a community. Note also that nothing prevents to understand the denition
of a social community in a broader sense where the native population is not
racially or sexually but spatially (e.g., a village) or culturally (e.g., a linguistic
minority) specied.
Formally, a social system4 is a mapping soc from 2S towards 2S . In short,
we say that the social system soc represents the social interaction N if (1) holds
for any A  S.
Denition 1 : A social system soc is consistent if there exists an interaction
N such that soc represents the relation N .
Theorem 1 : A social system soc is consistent if and only if
(A1) the society S forms a social community: soc (S) = S,
(A2) for two populations A;B  S such that A  B: soc (A)  soc (B).
(All proofs are in Appendix.)
A1 is called inclusivity and means that the society S is assumed to be
1-cohesive whatever happens to smaller communities. A1 requires that any
individual in S knows that S exists and is the greatest social community he
belongs to. A1 has also a avor of a civil peace requirement as explicitly
shown by Lemma 1 below.
A2 corresponds to monotonicity of the social communities with respect to
the size of the associated sequence of nested native populations. This means that
a community based on a big native population is bigger than a community based
on a smaller nested one. For instance, the American population is obviously
bigger than the Afro-American one and the two associated communities, i.e.
the individuals who revendicate and essentially dene themselves as Americans
or Afro-Americans are ranked the same way. This axiom then introduces some
minimal regularity in the sociological phenomena we study which seems to be
empirically relevant (see e.g. Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988, ch. 5).
Theorem 1 states that if a social system consistently represents an interac-
tion, it satises the two conditions.5 Conversely, if a given social system satises
the two conditions, then there exists an interaction which generates the social
system. Actually, the proof illustrates the uniqueness of the interaction for a
given system.
3This is consistent with Lévi-Strausss analysis (e.g., 1961) and overall the recent Guérins
works (2001):
4This concept is close to that of a local interaction system as dened by Morris (2000).
5Note that inclusivity and monotonicity can be seen as the set-theoretic translation of the
two conditions that dene, in decision theory, a set function as a Choquet capacity.
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Remark 1 : When characterized by N (i) = fj 2 S : i =2 N (S j)g (for all indi-
viduals i of S), the interaction N means that an individual j is a social neighbor
of individual i i¤ the complement population S j does not form a social com-
munity.
3 Preferences and Economic Communities
Consider a xed nite set X of options a; b; c::: Call an issue any vector x of
Xn such that the ith coordinate xi corresponds to a particular option of X
that is allocated to (or chosen by) individual i. Basically, any option can be
allocated to (or chosen by) any individual. The set Xn is the n-size set of all
possible individual issues.6 For any population A  S, xA denotes the tuple
fxigi2A. Furthermore, if z = (xA; y A), it means that zi = xi 2 X for all
individuals i 2 A and zj = yj 2 X for all the other individuals j =2 A. Each
individual i 2 S is assumed to rank the issues according to a preference relation
<i, that is a complete binary relation dened over Xn Xn: 8 (x; y) 2 (Xn)2:
x <i y or y <i x: This way, x <i y means that for i, issue x is at least as good
as issue y. Two issues x; y are considered indi¤erent, that is denoted x i y
when, simultaneously, x <i y and y <i x. A complete relation < is ordered if it
satises transitivity: for all issues x; y; z 2 Xn, x < y and y < z implies x < z.
Note that any complete binary relation which is ordered is also reexive: for all
issues x 2 Xn, x < x.
Let an individual i 2 S be such that
(xA; y A) i (xA; z A) for all x; y; z 2 Xn. (2)
Such an individual i is said to be interdependent with the population A and the
subset of all individuals interdependent with A is called the economic community
(based on A) and denoted eco(A).
An economic community is a set of individuals who share a common inter-
est for a particular population (without necessarily being members of it). More
precisely, the individuals who belong to the same economic community reveal
that they are always sensitive to what happens to a particular population while
never sensitive to the rest of the society; they expand (or export) the selsh
device beyond themselves but untill the border of a given population. For in-
stance, parents are generally sensitive to the economic condition in life of their
children and little children. If they restrict their interest to this small subset of
individuals, they form an economic community who can behave in a way which
makes the whole family happy (in sharing by advance the capital with equity, in
helping the youngest...). If a family (even spatially and then socially scattered)
is a natural candidate for being an economic community, note that an individual
can form his own economic community when he is selsh (this situation corre-
sponds to the Senian liberal one, see Billot, 2003). By the way, (2) also can be
seen as an equation for the rst Marxists-socialists who considered the industrial
proletariat, that is here the native A, as the only population whose economic
6Hence, if S = f1; 2g and X = fa; bg, then the set X2 of issues is:
f(a; 1; a; 2) ; (a; 1; b; 2) ; (b; 1; b; 2) ; (b; 1; a; 2)g
where x = (a; 1; b; 2) means that x1 = a while x2 = b, that is 1 chooses a while 2 chooses b.
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situation, that is xA, fully determines the historical and political evolution of a
society. In short, there are numerous potential economic communities: friends
circle, families, rms, classes, villages, minorities...
An economic system is a mapping eco from 2S towards 2S .
In what follows, we investigate the relationship between the properties of the
social system and the properties of the economic system, that is the theoretical
link between the interaction N via the social communities with the individual
preferences via the economic communities. The intuition is that standard mi-
croeconomics requirements about individual rationality implicitly correspond to
a particular organization of the social system:
Theorem 2 : The economic system eco forms a consistent social system if and
only if preference relations are completely ordered.
It is also possible to prove a converse result: for any consistent social system,
there exist complete ordered preference relations such that each social commu-
nity is also an economic community.
From Theorem 1, we know that a social system is consistent i¤ A1 and A2
are satised. Hence, one way to prove Theorem 2 is to prove that, when the
agents are interdependent, complete ordered relations lead to set up a system of
economic communities which satisfy A1 andA2. For that purpose, we establish
the two following lemmas:
Lemma 1 : Preference relations are reexive if and only if A1 holds.
By (2), preference reexivity must be understood as an interdependence
constraint for all individuals in S. This way, reexivity ensures that the society
S is formed with people who dene a community from both sides, social and
economic.
Lemma 2 : Preference relations are transitive if and only if A2 holds.
Preference transitivity implies a kind of consistency between a rst pair of
issues, a second, a third, etc... and a last one which collapses all the intermediate
steps. The property of monotonicity corresponds somehow to the same kind of
consistency: inclusion of a sequence of native populations can be collapsed in
saying that the biggest native population (which is actually the society itself
by A1) includes all other communities with respect to the same nesting rule.
The intuition is simple. Consider the French last presidential elections:7 the
global set of individuals who choose among several candidates and vote for
Jospinis included in the set of individuals who choose among several parties
and vote for the Socialist onewhich in turn is included in the set of individuals
who choose between Right and Left and vote for the Left. In terms of native
populations, being in the rst population naturally implies to be in the second
one which in turn implies to be in the third one. Then, by (2), the community
based on the rst population, say the Jospinist trend within the Socialist Party,
cannot be greater than that based on the second population, say the voters of the
Socialist Party itself, nor that based on the third. Hence, preferences transitivity
and communities monotonicity translate the same kind of consistency in their
respective context.
7 In 2002.
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Theorem 2 exactly states that the interaction N is fairly represented by the
economic system eco when individual preferences are completely ordered. Fur-
thermore, if preference relations are completely ordered, each economic com-
munity exactly denes a social one, i.e. the two mappings, soc and eco, are
identical:
[(xA; y A) i (xA; z A) , 8x; y; z 2 Xn], [N (i)  A] . (3)
In this case, when soc (A) = eco (A), we simply call it a community. Hence,
the right interpretation of Theorem 2 seems to be the following: standard basic
assumptions about the individual behavior (that is, complete ordered prefer-
ences as a signal of rationality) are logically equivalent to an assumption about
the social organization of the society (that is, consistency of the social system).
In other words, individual rationality and social consistency can be considered
as the two faces of the same coin.

reexivity of preferences
transitivity of preferences
()
()
inclusivity of communities
monotonicity of communities

i.e.:
individual rationality () social consistency.
Beyond this formal equivalence, Theorem 2 means that the two following state-
ments are equivalent:
 When rational, individuals are interdependent with individuals with whom
they interact;
 When rational, individuals choose to interact with individuals with whom
they are interdependent.
In short, to be sensitive for instance in France to the so-called second gen-
erations situation in life requires to be in social contact with the immigrant
population. Hence, the existence of suburban ghettos (where immigrants often
represent the 2/3 of the inhabitants) prevent any real global sensitivity (of the
rest of the society) to the problems of this population. In the same time, being
a priori interdependent with such a population prevents to interact with people
outside and then can induce some communitaristbehaviors such as religious
fundamentalism, political extremism... Individual rationality, that is social con-
sistency, seems then to lead to a segregated (at least partitioned) society where
the di¤erent communities are economically and socially disjoint, except at the
level of the society itself, that is for some public events such as elections or wars
for which votes and lifes are totally aggregated within the national community
(A1).
Since individual rationality (in terms of preferences) is logically equivalent
to social consistency of the interaction system (in terms of communities), we
propose to go on the analysis in pointing out other kinds of equivalence between
well-known properties of the preferences (e.g. continuity and monotonicity) and
specic properties of the social system, e.g. group loyalty.
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4 Group Loyalty
When assuming preference relations to be completely ordered, we know by (3)
that if an individual i socially interacts with an individual j and belongs to a
community eco (A), then j belongs to the same community eco (A). This rela-
tionship is clearly strong. Similarly, economic interdependence is modeled by
means of the individuals indi¤erence between all situations where the native
population, say A, gets the same issue, i.e. xA, whatever happens to the rest
of the society, i.e. y A or z A... To weaken the possible relationship between
two individuals, we propose to introduce the concept of group loyalty. Actu-
ally, in a recent paper, Luttmer (2001) shows that individual preferences for
redistribution are not only determined by self-interest but also a¤ected by the
characteristics of the social environment (district, family...). One of the main
explanations for this empirical feature is the racial group loyalty: individuals
increase their support for welfare spending as the share of local recipients from
their own racial group rises. In our (more abstract terms), this phenomenon
means that when individuals are loyal with a given native population, they can
accept to loose something within a particular issue if it is benecial to the rest of
this native population (eventually a subset of it). Let us consider an individual
who is the born-in-France son of a Maghrebian immigrant, that is he belongs
to the second generation. Assume he becomes a famous and rich actor or a
soccer player (like Zinedine Zidane for instance). If he accepts (in supporting
or voting for a leftist party) to pay more taxes (i.e., to decrease his own utility)
in order to improve the standards of life of the French Muslims by means of
the redistribution system (i.e., to increase their utilities), he can be said loyal
with his native population. In short, group loyalty may translate a link which
is weaker than interdependence but nevertheless signicant.
Hence, in what follows, we seek for the conditions under which the previous
social entities (neighborhood and community) can constitute a population of
individuals who are loyal.
Write x  y if xi  yi for all i 2 S, x > y if x  y and xi > yi for some
i 2 S and x y if xi > yi for all i 2 S.
Denition 2 : Let an individual i 2 S. If for all issues x  y, there exist
issues z  y such that the individual j 6= i is better o¤ with (xj ; zi; z ij) rather
than with y ((xj ; zi; z ij) i y with xj  yj, zi  yi and z ij  y ij), then
such an individual i is said to be loyal with the individual j 2 S.
4.1 Neighborhood Loyalty
In the same spirit than previously, we search for proving that the concept of
group loyalty can be encapsulated within preferences properties.
A preference relation < is continuous if the set of issues fx 2 Xn : x < yg
is closed for every y 2 Xn and monotone if (xi; z i) < (yi; z i) for some issues
x; y; z 2 Xn implies that (xi; z i)  (yi; z i) for all x; y; z 2 Xn such that
xi > yi.
Theorem 3 : Let a consistent social system soc. If preference relations are
continuous and monotone, then any neighborhood is a subset of mutually loyal
individuals.
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Remark 2 : Note that, thanks to Theorem 2, Theorem 3 can be rewritten as
follows: if preference relations are continuous and monotone, then any neighbor-
hood is a subset of mutually loyal individuals. This result means that, in order to
be loyal with someone, an individual needs to socially interact with him: loyalty
is not altruism, it is rather the economic counterpart of social sensitiveness.
4.2 Community Loyalty
Are continuity and monotonicity of preference relations su¢ cient to ensure that
the result established in Theorem 3 can be naturally extended from neighbor-
hoods to communities? Intuitively, since a community requires more structure
than a neighborhood, the answer should be negative. Hence, we propose the
following characterization of preference relations in order to extend the result.
Given preference relations and a particular neighborhood N (i), write x <N(i) y
when x <j y for all individuals j 2 N (i) and x N(i) y when x <N(i) y and
x j y for some j 2 N (i).
Denition 3 : Let an individual i 2 S such that if x <i y, then x <N(i) y, for
all x; y 2 Xn. Such an individual i is said to be empathic with his neighborhood
N (i).
Empathy requires that the preferences of a given individual are sensitive (in
the most minimal way) to what other individualspreferences are when these
individuals belong to the social neighborhood of the rst individual. It can be
also written as: if x N(i) y, then x i y, for all x; y 2 Xn.
Theorem 4 : If preference relations are continuous and monotone and if indi-
viduals are empathic with their neighborhoods, then each smallest community is
a subset of mutually loyal individuals.
The following lemma is central for proving the theorem.
Lemma 3 : If all individuals are socially empathic with their neighborhood,
then i 2 N (j) implies N (i) = N (j), for all i; j 2 S.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that a social system soc represents an interac-
tion N . Then, soc (A \B) = fi 2 S : N (i)  A \Bg which is obviously equal
to fi 2 S : N (i)  Ag \ fi 2 S : N (i)  Bg, that is soc (A) \ soc (B). Now,
suppose that sc satises A1-A2. By A2, A  B ) soc (A)  soc (B) for all
populations A;B  S. Write S j for Sn fjg. Dene the interaction N as fol-
lows: N (i) = fj 2 S : i =2 N (S j)g. Show that the system soc represents the
interaction as dened above. (i) Suppose i 2 soc (A). Then, A  S j implies
by A2 i 2 soc (S j) which implies j =2 N (i). Thus, j 2 N (i) implies A * S j
12
which implies j 2 A. Hence, N (i)  A. (ii) Conversely, suppose N (i)  A.
If A = S, i 2 soc (S) by A1. Suppose then that we consider a population
A 6= S. Then, A = \j =2AS j . Since i =2 soc (S j) implies j 2 A, j =2 A implies
i 2 soc (S j). Hence, i 2 soc (S j) for all j =2 A implies, by the above denition
of A, i 2 soc (A).
Proof of Lemma 1. Write y; for y S . We have by denition of an economic
community:
eco (S) = fi 2 S : (xS ; y S) <i (xS ; z S) for all x; y; z 2 Xng
= fi 2 S : (xS ; y;) <i (xS ; z;) for all x; y; z 2 Xng
= fi 2 S : x <i x for all x 2 Xng
since xS = x. Then, it is obvious that eco (S) = S i¤ each preference relation is
reexive.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) By construction, A  B ) eco (A)  eco (B) is
equivalent to eco (A) \ eco (B) = eco (A \B). Hence, take any individual i 2 S
and two populations A and B such that i 2 eco (A) \ eco (B). By deni-
tion of an economic community, for all proles x; y; z 2 Xn: i 2 eco (A) ) 
xA\B ; y (A\B)

<i (xA\B ; yA\ B ; z A) and i 2 eco (B)) (xA\B ; yA\ B ; z A) <i 
xA\B ; z (A\B)

. Thus by transitivity:
 
xA\B ; y (A\B)

<i
 
xA\B ; z (A\B)

for all x; y; z 2 Xn. So, i 2 eco (A \B). (ii) Suppose now an agent i 2 S
such that i 2 eco (A \B). Then, for all x; y; z 2 Xn:  xA\B ; y (A\B) <i 
xA\B ; z (A\B)

.Thus, (xA; y A) <i (xA; z A) and (xB ; y B) <i (xB ; z B)
which implies: i 2 eco (A) \ eco (B).
Proof of Theorem 2: By Lemmas 1 and 2, we know that preference relations
are ordered if and only if A1 and A2 hold. By Theorem 1, we know a social
system is consistent if and only if A1 and A2 hold. Then, the economic system
eco is a consistent social system.
Proof of Theorem 3. (i) Let an individual j 2 N (i). By monotonicity of
is preference relation <i, we have: (xj ; y j) i y for all issues x; y 2 Xn
where xj > yj . Now, by continuity, there always exists an issue z  y such
that (xj ; z j) i y. Hence, i is loyal with j. (ii) Suppose now that i is loyal
with j. Then, by denition, (xj ; z j) i y for some x  y  z. Thus, by
monotonicity of is preference relation <i, we have: (xj ; z j) <i (yj ; z j) i y.
Hence, i 2 eco (j) by (2), that is j 2 N (i) since the interaction N is reexive and
symmetric. Hence, any neighborhood is a subset of mutually loyal individuals.
Proof of Lemma 3. Empathy can also be written: if x N(i) y, then x i y,
for all x; y 2 Xn. With symmetry of the relation N , if i 2 N (j) then j 2
N (i). Hence, N (i) = N (j), for all i; j 2 S, requires that if i 2 N (j), then
N (i)  N (j), namely the transitivity of the social interaction N . Prove the
contrapositive of the required property. Then, suppose that there exists three
individuals 1; 2; 3 2 S such that 1 2 N (2), 2 2 N (3) but 1 =2 N (3). Now, let
x1 = 1 while xi = 0 for all individual i 6= 1. By continuity of preference relations,
we have x 2 0n where 0n is the null vector of Xn. Then, x <i 0n for all i 2 S.
Thus, it is true that x N(i) 0n. But, in the same time, since 1 =2 N (3), then
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0n 3 x. Now, x N(i) 0n for all i 2 S and 0n 3 x is a contradiction. So, if
i 2 N (j), then N (i)  N (j) and, by symmetry, N (i) = N (j).
Proof of Theorem 4. The result is immediate by (1) and Lemma 3 since
eco (N (i)) = N (i). This way, smallest communities exactly correspond to
neighborhoods as implied by the social interaction and then, Theorem 3 holds.
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